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Abstract
This article examines how accession to and subsequent membership of the EU has influenced the
dissemination of corporate governance characteristics and the financial performance of the bank-
ing industry. Using a hand-collected, cross-national dataset from EU member and candidate states
the analysis indicates the candidacy period is associated with the better financial performance of
banks than the latter period of EU membership. EU membership also has a significant negative in-
fluence on adopting some corporate governance arrangements. We infer this result is consistent
with instrumental rationality explanations of Europeanization. While the process of accession
has brought benefits, these are not always reinforced by subsequent EU membership.
Keywords: accession; corporate governance; institutions
Introduction
While it has been long assumed that EU membership improves the political, economic,
institutional, social and educational standards of member states, these benefits have been
increasingly questioned (Rosamond, 2020). To contribute to this wider discourse we ex-
amine how a critical industry; namely, banking, has been affected by this political process
of joining or accession to the EU. Specifically, we examine how banks from candidate
states, new member states and existing long-term EU member states have benefited from
EU developments in corporate governance. We propose that if states join the EU for ex-
ternal incentive reasons, adherence to and benefits from regulatory developments would
affect candidate states far more than EU members. Alternatively, if long-term EU mem-
bership alters national institutions and how firms and states behave, we would expect to
observe little difference between the performance of banks from candidate and member
states.
We empirically examined these research questions using a hand-collected data set of
211 sample banks over the period 2000–15. These data are drawn from 11 EU member
states, five candidate states and a control sample of banks from four long-standing EU
member states. We report that the accession process influences the corporate governance
practices of banks in candidate states more than that in EU member states. Moreover, the
financial performance of banks from candidate states is seen as superior to banks from
member-state banks. We observe more adherence to, and economic benefit arising from
EU regulatory demands during the accession process relative to actual EU membership.
This study contributes to the literature examining EU accession (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier, 2004; Tamazian and Melikyan, 2010; Börzel and Risse, 2012; Economides
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and Ker-Lindsay, 2015; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2020) and corporate gover-
nance in banking (Becht et al., 2011; Mehran et al., 2011; Aebi et al., 2012; Berger
et al., 2016; De Haan and Vlahu, 2016; Manganaris et al., 2017; Arnaboldi
et al., 2020). We contribute to the accession literature by examining the effects of acces-
sion on corporate governance in a single industry. This study does not focus on the influ-
ence of any specific policy action yet quantifies the influence of EU accession and
membership on the scope of corporate governance arrangements. While politics has been
seen to influence corporate governance arrangements (Roe, 2003), the effects of EU
accession or other political processes on banking corporate governance has not to been
examined to date.
The banking industry is a suitable subject for this examination due to the persistent
policy focus placed on enhancing the corporate governance arrangements of banks. Over
the past two decades the European Commission and other policymakers have published
multiple policy documents and directives to enhance bank corporate governance (Gros
and Schoenmaker, 2014). EU policymakers have particularly focused on a strategy of
strengthening firm boards, improving company-level disclosure and increasing monitor-
ing of institutional investors (Dallas and Pitt-Watson, 2016). While the EU has actively
promoted enhanced corporate governance arrangements since the early 2000s, how these
changes are transmitted remains unclear. While these developments have influenced cor-
porate governance practices in new member and candidate states, the net influence of the
EU accession process on bank corporate governance is unclear. We report the EU acces-
sion process influences the diffusion of and compliance with new regulations. This is
important, as corporate governance is an essential element of financial regulation and
supervision internationally (Dermine, 2013), with numerous studies reporting that the
performance of banks is significantly affected by corporate governance (Adams and
Mehran, 2008; de Andres Alonso and Vallelado, 2008; Cornett et al., 2009; Hagendorff
et al., 2010; Van Ness et al., 2010; Erkens et al., 2012; De Haan and Vlahu, 2016;
Fernandes et al., 2018).
The study is structured as follows. After this introduction, we discuss the EU accession
process, summarize key corporate governance developments, outline the theoretical
background of the study and state the research questions. The data, sample, variables,
and estimation methods and models are then introduced. The results are then reported
and finally, conclusions are drawn.
Context and Theoretical Foundations
To join the EU candidate states must fulfil accession requirements to improve their eco-
nomic, social, political and cultural standards. All applications for accession to the EU
are subject to an opinion issued by the European Commission and a decision taken by
the European Council. Before being approved the candidate state must fulfil several
conditions, abide by the accession or Copenhagen criteria (European Parliament, 1993).
After EU accession, new member states of the EU have to act in accordance with the
provisions of the EU law in force in the same manner as old member states.
As part of this process, both mandatory EU regulatory measures and EU soft law
measures have been introduced to improve corporate governance. The Winter group
(The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts, 2001) and the EU financial services
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action plan (Commission of the European Communities, 1999) encouraged the conver-
gence of national corporate governance codes for all firms and banks. Subsequently, the
EU action plan on modernizing company law and enhancing corporate governance
(Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, 2003), the Green Paper on financial services policy (Commission of the
European Communities, 2005), the driving European recovery report (Commission of
the European Communities, 2009) and the Green Paper on corporate governance in finan-
cial institutions and remuneration policies (European Commission, 2010) have all
emerged to enhance corporate governance arrangements for banks and firms. These
progressive developments (McGee, 2006) have created an unprecedented situation where
an external governance process transfers multiple regulations to candidate states
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). In recent years, regulatory developments
have been diverse (Kubíček et al., 2016) including the Societates Europaeae
(Raaijmakers, 2015) and the non-financial disclosure Directive 2014/95/EU
(Kinderman, 2020), revised national corporate governance codes and proposed enhance-
ments to the gender diversity of boards (European Commission, 2012; Arnaboldi
et al., 2020).
To date the empirical evidence reports candidate states do not always engage with the
accession process (Tamazian and Melikyan, 2010) and that states join the EU as much
for political opportunism as for a commitment to EU values (Economides and
Ker-Lindsay, 2015). Candidate and new member states are also influenced by historical
institutions (Andreff, 2006; Vliegenthart and Horn, 2007) and often they are influenced
by their socialist legacies (Dobak, 2006). These have affected new member and candidate
states differently (Tamazian and Melikyan, 2010), resulting in some states engaging more
fully than others with the European ideal. This focus on external incentives may have ad-
verse future consequences. These include backsliding on past agreements and ongoing
dissatisfaction with EU agreements in certain states (Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier, 2020). Compliance with all agreements may be tempered by some states
having less developed financial markets, limited investor rights, poor law enforcement
and weaker political institutions. Lobbying, domestic politics and transaction costs
(Cernat, 2004) also limit the convergence of corporate governance standards
(Chalmers, 2020).
Convergence could also be encouraged by states competing for inward investment by
establishing favourable policy regimes to reassure and attract foreign investors (Ferrero
and Ackrill, 2016). Indeed, corporate governance practices in many central European
states have improved following their participation in the EU (McGee, 2006). Before
2007 this convergence was towards market-based approaches. After 2007 the direction
of this confluence is disputed, either moving towards a continental model (Arnaboldi
and Casu, 2011) or towards other corporate governance models (Cernat, 2004).
Subsequently, no single European corporate governance model has developed, and
several stylized corporate governance models exist across the EU (Llewellyn, 2006;
Schäfer, 2016).
The corporate governance of banks differs from corporate governance requirements for
other firms (Mülbert, 2009; Becht et al., 2011; De Haan and Vlahu, 2016). By undertak-
ing financial intermediation banks face and create distinct risks, have a distinct capital
structure (Berger et al., 2016), possess opaque balance sheets (Manganaris et al., 2017)
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and require specific regulation (Arnaboldi et al., 2020). Corporate governance character-
istics subsequently have implications for how banks manage financial risks (Chen and
Lin, 2016) and are regulated (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013) where monitoring is under-
taken jointly by bank supervisors, regulators and shareholders. For example, levels of
managerial ownership (Berger et al., 2016), board independence and board size
(Fernandes et al., 2018) influence bank performance quite differently from other firms
and vary with prevailing risk conditions (Fernandes et al., 2017). Comprehensive litera-
ture reviews are provided by Mülbert (2009), Becht et al. (2011), De Haan and
Vlahu (2016) and Fernandes et al. (2018).
Reflecting the distinctiveness of banks’ corporate governance, multiple national and
intra-national bodies have made interventions and contributions to this field. Nationally,
the UK Walker Report (Walker, 2009) and the Central Bank of the Netherlands (De
Nederlandsche Bank, 2015) place corporate governance central to prudential supervision.
Following the eurozone crisis, EU regulatory bodies questioned the existing corporate
governance structure of financial institutions (European Commission, 2012), developing
an action plan and new regulatory structure for financial institutions (Commission of
the European Communities, 2009). This nascent system rests on three regulatory pillars:
the single supervisory mechanism, the single resolution mechanism and the emerging
European deposit insurance scheme. This covers all eurozone countries and influences
corporate governance practices across the EU banking industry.
That the EU accession process has altered the corporate governance practices of banks
in EU new member or candidate states is undoubted. The utility of this transition remains
less than clear. We propose that the reasons why states join the EU affects the influence of
accession on corporate governance in candidate and member states. This might arise from
external incentives, including a desire to benefit from the considerable advantages associ-
ated with EU membership. Following such instrumental rationality, a state will adapt as
much as necessary to fulfil the conditions required during candidacy. It is plausible that
states may limit such changes when compliance costs are high and membership benefits
have already been achieved (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). If regulations are
distinct from those previously employed, regulatory compliance is less likely (Börzel
and Risse, 2012).
The EU can overcome these concerns through persuasion, whereby progress towards
accession goals is rewarded and its benefits are withdrawn for a lack of compliance.
Assuming instrumental rationality, if rewards are limited or threats implausible, compli-
ance will be limited. Normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Deephouse, 1996) may then arise, limiting the dissemination of European business
practices in candidate states. For example, introducing new corporate governance codes
(Fiss, 2008; Chizema and Kim, 2010) may lead to resistance and result in a merely
cosmetic, tick-box form of compliance (Solomon, 2013).
Alternatively, joining the EU may lead to fundamental economic and social change as
collective EU values are embraced in a ‘lesson-learning’ process. During the accession
period, candidate states and their companies may experience radical institutional change
fostering convergence with EU rules and resolving existing national policy challenges
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). This assumes coercive isomorphism and mi-
metic isomorphism mechanisms affect political and legal institutions of EU, including
all EU law in force. These organizational changes are driven by multiple mechanisms
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including the constitution of capitalist market institutions, privatization and foreign direct
investment. For instance, foreign bank holding companies will encourage similar forms of
management in their subsidiary banks (Claessens and Van Horen, 2014).
Thus, institutional theory provides an insight as to how accession to the EU influences
bank corporate governance. As corporate governance characteristics may develop
differently in candidate, new members and existing EU member states, we propose two
hypothesizes. If external incentives dominate, self-interested instrumental rationality is
displayed and candidate and new member states adopt a cost–benefit approach to
implementing regulations, we expect:
H1 Differences in how banks from candidate and member states have adopted, adhered to,
and benefited from corporate governance changes are present.
If non-mandatory EU measures or standards are adopted through lesson learning and
embracing EU ideals, compliance is expected to be more successful. Under these circum-
stances, we expect:
H2 Corporate governance developments will benefit banks from candidate and member
states equally.
Research Methodology
We examined these research questions to consider differences between candidate and
membership periods. This is undertaken for banks from existing, new member and candi-
date states. The relative performance and corporate governance arrangements of banks are
assessed using multiple methods to determine if EU accession and membership influence
the dissemination of corporate governance arrangements and bank performance. To illu-
minate how this evaluation is conducted, the dataset construction and sample selection
are outlined, and then the descriptive and inferential methods of assessment are
summarized.
The dataset covers 211 banks operating in EU member and candidate states from an
estimated population of 2,241 banks. The banks chosen include mainly larger banks that
have provided data across the entire sample period 2000–15. The period of analysis was
selected to enable an examination of both EU candidacy and membership periods. Banks
are considered from four long-established EU member states (France, Germany, Greece
and Spain), recent new members of the EU who have been through an accession process
and candidate states still within the accession process. The first group of new members
consists of eight states1 that entered the EU in 2004, the second group includes two states
enrolling in 2007 and lastly Croatia which joined in 2013. There are five candidate states
still to join the EU (Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey).
1
We did not include banks from Malta and Cyprus for reasons of consistency in the sample construction. The member and
candidate states are classified by the aforementioned databases as developing economies that share similar features by
means of their geographical, institutional and political backgrounds.
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Several economic and financial databases from the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, the Emerging Markets Monitor, the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, FTSE, S&P and SNL Financial were used to compile control variables.
States were divided into three different groups according to their location (southern, east-
ern and northern Europe and Turkey) and their income level (upper-middle and high in-
come) using the World Bank classification. These variables are included to reflect the
range of influences over bank performance and the dissemination of corporate gover-
nance characteristics beyond EU accession. Further information is provided in Table 1.
The variable definitions are provided in Table 2. EU membership is represented by a
binary variable equal to one for the EU membership period and 0 otherwise. To assess
the effect of EU membership on corporate governance structure, board size, board inde-
pendence, female directors and foreign directors were considered interchangeably as the
dependent variables (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Boone et al., 2007; Linck
et al., 2008; Chen and Wu, 2014). At the EU level these corporate governance character-
istics have been the focus of both proposed legislation, as in the case of diversity
(European Commission, 2012) and expectation to comply with providing better











Panel A. Control group EU members (developed countries)
France Western French 229 16 121
Germany Western German 1,572 16 159
Greece Southern German 9 7 86
Spain Western French 149 13 95
Panel B. EU member since 2004 (all high-income level countries)
Czech RepublicEastern German 20 9 115
Estonia Northern German 10 10 108
Hungary Eastern German 16 9 110
Latvia Northern German 17 10 112
Lithuania Northern French 8 7 66
Poland Eastern German 33 13 130
Slovak
Republic
Eastern German 14 10 110
Slovenia Southern German 19 9 97
Panel C. EU member since 2007 (all upper-middle income level countries)
Bulgaria Eastern German 17 9 120
Romania Eastern French 14 6 61
Panel D. EU member since 2013 (high-income level country)
Croatia Southern German 18 7 78
Panel E. Candidates (All upper-middle income level countries)
Albania Southern French 10 6 47
FYROM Southern French 13 8 70
Montenegro Southern French 11 8 56
Serbia Southern French 20 8 65
Turkey Eastern French 42 30 309
Source: World Bank, UN and La Porta et al. (2008)
FYROM, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
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functioning bank boards or explain why such developments have not been provided (Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2013). These characteristics
have also been considered in a variety of national and international guides and regula-
tions, including both mandatory and non-binding measures. Table 3 summarises the Na-
tional Board types used in the sample states.
To consider financial performance, three common performance variables; return on as-
set (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and net interest margin (NIM) were collected. Models
Table 2: Variable Definitions
Variables Definitions
European Union indicator
EU membership Dummy variable equals 1 for membership period and 0 otherwise
Corporate governance variables (hand-collected data)
Variable
definitions
Board size The number of directors on the supervisory board (natural
logarithm of board size)
Board independence Following Aebi et al. (2012), a board member is independent if
they do not have another relationship with the bank. We recorded
the percentage of independent outside directors on the
supervisory board
Gender diversity (female) The percentage of female directors
Nationality diversity The percentage of foreign directors
Board structure (tier) Dummy variable equals 1 if a dual board exists and 0 otherwise
CEO/chairman duality Dummy variable equals 1 if the CEO also holds the chairman role
and 0 otherwise
Foreign ownership Dummy variable equals 1 if 50% of bank shares were foreign
owned and 0 otherwise
Performance variables (Source: Bankscope, authors’ calculations)
Return on assets Net income divided by average total assets
Return on equity Net income divided by average shareholders’ equity
Net interest margin Net interest revenue divided by total earning assets
Bank-level variables (Source: Bankscope, authors’ calculations)
Asset quality ratio Loan loss reserve divided by gross loans
Capital ratio Equity divided by total assets
Operation ratio Cost to income ratio
Liquidity ratio Liquid assets divided by deposits and short-term funding
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets
Country-level variables (Source: World Bank, IMF 2017, The Heritage Foundation and
Kaufmann et al., 2010)




A research dataset summarizing the quality of governance based
on several surveys’ responses. The dimensions of the dataset
include voice and accountability, political stability and absence
of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, control of corruption. (2000–15)
Index of economic freedom
(The Heritage Foundation)
Measures economic freedom based on 12 quantitative and
qualitative indicators, grouped into four categories of economic
freedom: rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency,
open markets. (2000–15)
Financial crisis dummy Dummy variable equals 1 for periods affected by the global
financial crisis and eurozone crisis (2008–12)
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using all these measures as a dependent variable were estimated, with similar results for
all measures recorded. For brevity we report only findings from ROA; all results are avail-
able on request. To deal with extreme values all bank-level variables were winsorized at 1
per cent and 5 per cent levels. The selected performance and corporate governance
variables have been used in comparable assessments (de Andres Alonso and
Vallelado, 2008; Ferreira et al., 2010; Westman, 2011; Liang et al., 2013).
Both descriptive and inferential statistics are used in the analysis. Differences in mean
values for banks from distinct groups of states are reported using descriptive statistics. To
determine the most appropriate method of testing, normality results, t-tests and
Mann–Whitney U tests were undertaken. The relationship between EU membership,
corporate governance and performance is examined using an unbalanced panel data
regression model. To determine an appropriate estimation method pretesting was under-
taken. Hausman and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests indicated the fixed effects
model is appropriate. We controlled for fixed effects to eliminate the impact of
time-invariant characteristics in assessing the net effect of the independent variables on
the dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2002). The fixed effects models were estimated
using bank fixed-effects estimators, including country and year dummies with
bank-clustered robust (White) standard errors. In the base model (1) D denotes dummy
variables, C denotes control variables, u denotes the fixed effect of bank i and ɛ denotes
the remaining disturbance term:
yit ¼ βX it þ Ditαþ Cit þ ui þ εi; y (1)
The additional analysis used different dependent variables and sub-samples. First, to
examine the influence of EU membership and corporate governance variables on bank
performance, the financial performance indicator, ROAwas used as a dependent variable.
Second, the impact of EU accession and membership was analysed by dividing the
sample into before and after EU accession periods. Lastly, to investigate the association
between selected corporate governance and the EU dummy on bank performance,
interaction terms were created by multiplying the EU dummy variable with the aforemen-
tioned variables and using these within the base model. Throughout other variables,
selected corporate governance, bank-level and country-level variables were used as
control variables in all regressions.
Table 3: National Board Type
National board Type Board type (Source: EU Commission and EBRD)
Dual board
Croatia Slovak Republic Latvia Estonia Poland




Bulgaria France Romania Lithuania
Unitary
Montenegro Spain Turkey Greece
Notes: EBRD, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, FYROM, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
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Results
Descriptive statistics and tests results are provided in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 provides av-
erages for the full sample and Table 5 reports differences between candidate and EU
states. Significant differences between all variables are recorded. Financial performance
is higher in candidate states’ banks and levels of corporate governance characteristics
are higher in member-state banks, except for the number of independent directors.
In Table 6 we observe differences between candidacy and membership periods for
banks from states that joined the EU in 2004 (panel A), 2007 (panel B) and 2013 (panel
C). In panel A the movement from candidacy status to EU membership is associated with
an increase in the proportion of female and foreign directors and a decline in board
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Continuous variables Total observations Mean Median SD
A. Governance variables
Female director 1654 0.13 0.11 0.14
Board independence 1654 0.15 0.11 0.18
Foreign director 1654 0.52 0.57 0.35
Board size 1654 7.54 7.00 2.63
B. Performance variables
ROA 1654 1.09 1.20 1.87
ROE 1654 9.07 11.30 20.01
NIM 1654 4.18 3.77 2.54
Panel B. Dummy variables Observations (n) Percentage
CEO duality 1654 28 1.70
Tier (1) 1654 1196 72.31
Foreign (1) 1654 1139 68.86
Table 5: Corporate Governance Characteristics of Banks in the Candidate and Member States
Panel B EU state banks Candidate state banks t-test Mann–
Whitney
Observations, n 831 823
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
A. Governance variables
Female director 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.14 2.843** 2.710**
Board independence 0.14 0.00 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.14 1.956*** 4.793***
Foreign director 0.55 0.60 0.33 0.48 0.52 0.36 4.474*** 4.236***
Board size 7.42 7.00 2.74 7.67 7.00 2.51 1.967** 2.490**
B. Performance variables
ROA 0.75 1.04 1.92 1.43 1.40 1.75 7.506*** 7.680***
ROE 6.48 10.37 21.57 11.69 12.54 13.98 5.818*** 4.218***
NIM 3.31 2.96 2.03 5.06 4.61 2.70 14.910*** 20.520***
Notes: * P = 10%; ** P = 5% *** P = 1% ROA, return on asset; ROE, return on equity; NIM, net interest margin.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Comparison of Corporate Governance
Characteristics and Performance of New Member States
Panel A. Banks in the EU countries which became members in 2004
Observations, n 2000–3 2004–15 t-test Mann–
Whitney
157 691
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
A. Governance variables
Female director 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.16 2.362** 1.808*
Board independence 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.21 1.548 2.683***
Foreign director 0.47 0.50 0.31 0.54 0.59 0.33 2.319** 2.517**
Board size 8.00 8.00 3.05 7.57 7.00 2.79 1.727* 1.470
B. Performance variables
ROA 1.20 1.11 1.63 0.70 1.03 1.99 2.939*** 1.428
ROE 13.10 13.15 15.31 6.00 10.69 22.91 3.703*** 3.360***
NIM 3.64 3.55 1.14 3.07 2.77 2.08 3.331*** 8.083***
Panel B. Banks in the EU countries which became members in 2007
Observations, n 2000–6 2007–15 t-test Mann–
Whitney
56 125
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
A. Governance variables
Female director 0.12 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.363 1.057
Board independence 0.09 0.00 1.18 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.373 0.400
Foreign director 0.61 0.75 0.35 0.62 0.69 0.33 0.093 0.150
Board size 6.23 5.00 3.01 6.52 7.00 2.38 0.692 0.950
B. Performance variables
ROA 2.21 2.01 1.03 1.15 1.25 1.28 5.405*** 5.434***
ROE 18.85 18.01 12.54 10.31 9.46 11.49 5.122*** 5.670***
NIM 6.68 6.18 2.28 4.65 4.53 1.16 7.905*** 5.877***
Panel C. Banks in the EU countries that became members in 2013
Observations, n 2000–12 2013–15 t-test Mann–
Whitney
63 15
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
A. Governance variables
Female director 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.09 1.983* 2.255**
Board independence 0.03 0.00 0.59 0.07 0.10 0.63 2.186** 2.298**
Foreign director 0.93 1.00 0.93 0.89 0.88 0.70 1.251 1.733
Board size 7.25 7.00 2.58 8.73 9.00 1.87 2.087** 2.036**
B. Performance variables
ROA 1.25 1.30 0.47 0.40 0.47 2.64 4.721** 4.343***
ROE 12.56 13.21 6.46 3.24 2.74 19.01 5.464*** 4.526***
NIM 3.55 3.54 0.64 3.20 3.13 0.68 1.910* 1.477
Notes: * P = 10%; ** P = 5%; *** P = 1% ROA, return on asset; ROE, return on equity; NIM, net interest margin.
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Table 7: The EU as a Determinant of Corporate Governance Structure
New member and candidate states banks (A) All sample banks (B)














































































































































































































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects

















R2 within 0.11 0.21 0.09 0.26 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.22
between 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.04 0.01 0.14
overall 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.16
Observations,
N
1,652 1,652 1,652 1,652 2,108 2,108 2,108 2,108
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independence and size and financial performance. The results in panel B consider
Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007. Between the pre-accession
(2000–6) and post-accession (2007–15) periods the mean board size rose and board inde-
pendence and the share of females on boards fell by an insignificant degree. The means of
ROA, ROE and NIM, representing financial performance, significantly fell between these
pre and post-accession periods. Panel C reports findings for Croatian banks, including an
increase in the share of female directors on boards from 6 per cent between 2000 and
2012 to 11 per cent in the post-accession period. Overall we observe corporate gover-
nance arrangements are increasingly disseminated over time. To examine whether this
change is influenced by EU membership or just by the passage of time, we turn to
inferential statistics.
Results from the regression analysis are provided in Tables 7, 8, and 9. The analysis
four corporate governance variables used as dependent variables is presented in Table
6. The results in panel A include all banks that have transitioned through an accession
process. Panel B considers all sample banks. The first, second, third and fourth columns
present the regression results for board size, board independence, female directors and
foreign directors, respectively. The findings from panel A indicate the relationship be-
tween EU membership with board size and independence is significantly negative; that
is, board size and independence decreased during EU membership. Panel B provides re-
sults for all sample banks and indicates that EU membership has no significant impact on
board size, or female and foreign directors. The relationship between EU membership and
board independence is significantly negative. Therefore, when comparing banks from
states undergoing accession with banks from all states, the major difference is the nega-
tive association with board size.
In the supplementary assessments we estimate the model using ROA as a dependent
performance variable (Table 8). This model is estimated for all banks that have gone
through the accession process (panel A), those within EU member states only (panel
B), those from candidate states (panel C) and all banks (panel D). EU membership has
a significantly negative influence on bank performance. When comparing estimates from
these sub-samples, we are particularly interested in significant results for banks from
states with differing membership attributes. For instance, candidate states alone display
a significant negative relationship between bank performance and board independence
and foreign directors and a significantly positive relationship between bank performance
and CEO duality. We can infer that banks from candidate states undergoing accession
have lower performance when there is greater board independence and more foreign di-
rectors. These banks also benefit from CEO duality relative to other EU member-state
banks.
Notes: * P = 10%; ** P = 5%; *** P = 1% Variables 1, 2, 3 and 4 indicate dependent variables for board size, board inde-
pendence, female and foreign directors, respectively. The bank-clustered robust standard errors of the coefficients are in pa-
rentheses. Panel A comprises banks from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Albania, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM,)
Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. Panel B comprises banks from Albania, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia,
France, Germany, Greece and Spain. ROA, return on asset.
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Table 8: The Impact of EU and Corporate Governance Characteristics on Bank Performance








EU membership 0.384*** (0.148) 0.345*** (0.127) - 0.531*** (0.156)
Board size 0.314 (0.199) 0.294 (0.226) 0.128 (0.191) 0.304* (0.180)
Board independence 0.056 (0.474) 0.090 (0.619) 0.904** (0.410) 0.273 (0.393)
CEO duality 0.167 (0.243) 0.030 (0.339) 0.602* (0.326) 0.082 (0.196)
Female directors 0.689** (0.305) 0.275 (0.368) 0.817*** (0.298) 0.564** (0.299)
Foreign directors 0.132 (0.312) 0.210 (0.357) 0.626** (0.263) 0.112 (0.295)
Tier (board type) 0.041 (0.258) 0.030 (0.271) 0.227 (0.158) 0.067 (0.221)
Bank size 0.156 (0.126) 0.301*** (0.095) 0.194** (0.082) 0.064 (0.141)
Loan loss provision 0.451*** (0.070) 0.591*** (0.092) 0.194** (0.082) 0.516*** (0.078)
Liquidity 0.067 (0.070) 0.153** (0.076) 0.057 (0.067) 0.096 (0.063)
Capital 1.163*** (0.182) 0.441** (0.179) 0.840*** (0.185) 1.135*** (0.186)
Operation 3.134*** (0.275) 2.941*** (0.291) 1.682*** (0.278) 2.764*** (0.272)
World governance
indicators
0.542 (0.469) 0.516 (0.513) 0.520 (0.453) 0.411 (0.355)
Index of economic freedom 0.294 (0.811) 1.223 (0.855) 2.831 (2.040) 0.573 (0.835)
GDP per capita growth 0.085*** (0.016) 0.067*** (0.020) 0.059*** (0.016) 0.088*** (0.015)
Financial crisis dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 11.206*** (3.588) 21.861*** (3.696) 15.001* (8.072) 11.749*** (3.469)
R
2
within 0.48 0.49 0.54 0.43
between 0.45 0.15 0.64 0.46
overall 0.45 0.31 0.57 0.43
Observations, N 1,652 1,106 546 2,108































The impact of corporate governance variables on performance before and after the EU
membership is reported in Table 9. Critical to interpreting this analysis is the difference
between estimates for different scenarios. If accession and membership influence corpo-
rate governance arrangements then different estimates would be expected between
pre-membership and membership periods. This appears in most cases, although it sug-
gests that corporate governance arrangements have a greater negative influence on finan-
cial performance for banks from states that have experienced the accession process.
The third supplementary analysis, reported in Table 10 examines the association be-
tween selected corporate governance variables and performance variables. To undertake
this procedure, four interaction terms were created by multiplying the EU dummy with
board characteristics including its size, impendence and female and foreign directors.
The interaction variables were included in regression estimations separately for banks
from new EU member states, candidate states and all sample banks. The coefficients of
the interactions between the EU dummy and corporate governance variables are statisti-
cally insignificant. This implies that the impact of EU membership on a bank’s perfor-
mance is not dependent on the banks’ corporate governance characteristics.
Table 9: The Impact of EU Accession Process and Membership and Corporate Governance
Characteristics on Bank Performance









Board size 0.632** (0.315) 0.217 (0.274) 0.544** (0.272) 0.217 (0.274)
Board independence 0.686 (1.035) 0.046 (0.428) 0.746 (0.646) 0.046 (0.428)
CEO duality 0.556 (0.431) 0.728* (0.420) 0.446 (0.408) 0.728* (0.420)
Female directors 0.660 (0.490) 0.049 (0.406) 0.203 (0.435) 0.049 (0.406)
Foreign directors 0.533** (0.220) 0.436 (0.298) 0.222 (0.243) 0.436 (0.298)
Tier (board type) 0.142 (0.206) 0.333 (0.332) 0.138 (0.231) 0.333 (0.332)
Bank size 0.433* (0.244) 0.101 (0.173) 0.259 (0.204) 0.101 (0.173)
Loan loss provision 0.553*** (0.112) 0.351*** (0.081) 0.643*** (0.114)0.351*** (0.081)
Liquidity 0.145* (0.086) 0.118 (0.090) 0.147* (0.077) 0.118 (0.090)
Capital 1.477*** (0.336) 1.163*** (0.226) 1.340*** (0.274) 1.163*** (0.226)
Operation 2.790*** (0.473) 3.494*** (0.429) 2.133*** (0.393)3.494*** (0.429)
World governance indicators 1.274* (0.657) 0.837 (0.592) 1.134** (0.508) 0.837 (0.592)
Index of economic freedom 2.001 (1.842) 3.113** (1.330) 2.438 (1.806) 3.113** (1.330)
GDP per capita growth 0.065*** (0.023) 0.082*** (0.022) 0.080*** (0.020) 0.082*** (0.022)
Financial crisis dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 12.028 (9.451) 24.098*** (5.080) 13.131 (7.885) 24.098*** (5.080)
R2 within 0.50 0.47 0.42 0.47
between 0.38 0.56 0.34 0.56
overall 0.40 0.49 0.36 0.49
Observations, N 830 822 1,286 822
Notes: * P = 10%; ** P = 5%; *** P = 1% Return on asset is the dependent variable. The bank-clustered robust standard
errors of the coefficients are in parentheses. The sample was divided into two based on the state’s membership year and
candidacy.
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Table 10: EU Accession, EU Membership and Corporate Governance Characteristics effect on Bank Performance: Interaction Term Approach
Member and candidate states banks All sample banks
Variables ROA (Panel A) ROA (Panel A)



















- - - 0.231 (0.227) - - -
Board independence*EU - 0.249 (0.612) - - - 0.019 (0.523) - -
Female directors*EU - - 0.567 (0.538) - - - 0.732 (0.541) -
Foreign directors*EU - - - 0.260 (0.310) - - - 0.374 (0.326)
Board size 0.197
(0.214)






















Foreign directors 0.104 (0.308) 0.124 (0.308) 0.119 (0.316) 0.040 (0.310) 0.085 (0.292) 0.113 (0.291) 0.103 (0.299) 0.045 (0.302)
CEO duality 0.160 (0.244) 0.165 (0.244) 0.165 (0.243) 0.171 (0.242) 0.093 (0.198) 0.082 (0.196) 0.092 (0.197) 0.074 (0.194)
Tier (board type) 0.040 (0.264) 0.034 (0.262) 0.018 (0.273) 0.045 (0.254) 0.057 (0.222) 0.067 (0.221) 0.100 (0.224) 0.061 (0.214)
Bank- level
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level
variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial crisis
dummy
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects



















within 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
between 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46
overall 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.46
Number of
observations
1,652 1,652 1,652 1,652 2,108 2,108 2,108 2,108
































It has long been assumed membership of the EU brings high standards in political, eco-
nomic, institutional, social and educational areas. This study investigates how these ben-
efits are transmitted by the EU accession process by examining the banking industry of
member and candidate states. This research employs an institutional perspective to con-
sider how the EU accession process has influenced the dissemination of corporate gover-
nance characteristics in the banking industry. We report findings consistent with the view
that external incentives motivate accession. EU membership is associated with slower
corporate governance development. While corporate governance developments have in-
creasingly disseminated across the EU over time, EU membership is not a positive influ-
ence on this process. We also quantify the influence of EU membership with the
relationship between financial performance and corporate governance characteristics.
Both univariate and multivariate analyses report that candidate countries show better fi-
nancial performance than banks from member states.
We acknowledge the EU reforms of corporate governance issues go back to the early
2000s and any political process has a lagged influence. Also, some corporate governance
characteristics have developed more than others. For example, board independence and
female representation on boards is far greater for banks from candidate states than banks
from EU member states. Although the European Commission (2005) highlighted the im-
portance of board independence, this corporate governance characteristic remains low in
many member-state banks, possibly as foreign bank owners prefer to appoint their exec-
utives to the board of subsidiary banks to enhance their control (Claessens and Van
Horen, 2014).
While, policymakers dealing with corporate governance issues across the EU have
actively promoted improved corporate governance practices, this study reports that EU
membership has little influence on corporate governance practices in the banks of
member states. We argue that banks from states committed to joining the EU through
the accession process appear to have made far more progress, a finding consistent with
regulatory change reported elsewhere (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2020). We pro-
pose that the journey towards accession is far more influential in this respect than actual
membership of the EU.
Correspondence: John K. Ashton, Bangor University, Bangor, Gwynedd, UK.
email: j.ashton@bangor.ac.uk
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